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Abstract  
 Few Internet security organizations provide comprehensive, detailed, and reliable 
quantitative metrics, especially in the international perspective across multiple countries, 
multiple years, and multiple categories. As common refrain to justify this situation, organizations 
ask why they should spend valuable time and resources collecting and standardizing data.   
 This report aims to provide an encouraging answer to this question by demonstrating the 
value that even limited metrics can provide in a comparative perspective. We present some 
findings generated through the use of a research tool, the Explorations in Cyber Internet 
Relations (ECIR) Data Dashboard. In essence, this dashboard consists of a simple graphing and 
analysis tool, coupled with a database consisting of data from disparate national-level cyber data 
sources provided by governments, Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), and 
international organizations. Users of the dashboard can select relevant security variables, 
compare various countries, and scale information as needed.   
 In this paper, using this tool, we present an example of observations concerning the fight 
against cybercrime, along with several hypotheses attempting to explain the findings. We believe 
that these preliminary results suggest valuable ways in which such data could be used and we 
hope this research will help provide the incentives for organizations to increase the quality and 
quantity of standardized quantitative data available. 
 
. 
Keywords: Cybersecurity, Cybercrime, Computer Emergency Response Teams, Data Dashboard, 
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1. Introduction 
 Few Internet security organizations provide comprehensive, detailed, and reliable 
quantitative metrics, especially in the international perspective across multiple countries, 
multiple years, and multiple categories. A common refrain to justify this situation is that the 
Internet is changing too rapidly for such metrics to be useful; organizations ask why they should 
spend valuable time and resources collecting and standardizing data when the security sphere is 
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engaged in a continuous and rapidly-evolving battle against threats such as cyber crime and 
cyber warfare. 
 This report aims to provide an encouraging answer to this question by demonstrating the 
value that even limited metrics can provide in a comparative perspective. Although we recognize 
that Internet data can have a short shelf life and that attack vectors and methods are always 
changing, we are confident that careful data analysis can reveal insights useful for improving 
organizational competence and fostering accurate awareness of cyber threat trends.  
 We present some findings generated through the use of a research tool, the Explorations in 
Cyber Internet Relations (ECIR)1 Data Dashboard. In essence, this dashboard consists of a 
simple graphing and analysis tool, coupled with a database consisting of data from disparate 
national-level cyber data sources provided by governments, Computer Emergency Response 
Teams (CERTs), and international organizations. Users of the dashboard can select relevant 
security variables, compare various countries, and scale information as needed.  Using this tool, 
we have identified several distinct examples of observations concerning the fight against various 
types of cyber threat, along with hypotheses to explain each trend. In this paper, we present the 
analysis related to software piracy losses differences across multiple countries.  
 We believe that this analysis demonstrates valuable ways in which such data could be used 
and we hope this research will help provide the incentives for organizations to increase the 
quality and quantity of standardized quantitative data available. 
 
2. ECIR Data Dashboard  
2.1 Purpose of the ECIR Data Dashboard 
The ECIR Data Dashboard was developed to provide historical trend data and news to 
policymakers, academics, IT professionals and other stakeholders. By consulting the Dashboard, 
the user can compare trends in various categories in national-level cybersecurity threats and 
vulnerabilities among several countries and/or regions over time. Also, the user can use the 
Dashboard to compare these trends against other relevant national-level statistics to find patterns 
and correlations. The Dashboard provides data in five categories: 
• Demographic Data: Basic data about a country’s population, economy, education 
level, and other attributes that may affect the development of the country’s Internet 
services or IT security sectors. (Sources: World Development Indicators Database) 
• IT Data: Data outlining the state of the country’s IT infrastructure, usage, and 
security, including Internet bandwidth, users, services, etc. (Sources: ITU, World 
Development Indicators, CIA World Factbook) 
• Political Attributes: Data outlining the political environment in the country. (Sources: 
World Bank Governance Indicators, Polity IV, Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute) 
• Cybersecurity Data: Data that reflect chronological trends of threat/vulnerability 
                                                        
1 The Exploration in Cyber International Relations (ECIR) project is a collaboration consisting of the MIT Political Science 
department, the MIT Sloan School of Management, the MIT Elelectrical Engineering and Computer Sciemce (EECS) department, 
the Harvard Law School and the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. 
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statistics, such as Virus, worms, malware. (Sources: national CERTs.) 
• Cybercrime Attributes: Data indicating the degree of cybercrime in the country, such 
as Cybercrime Damage Dollar Loss, Cybercrime Arrests, Cybercrimes reported to 
police. (Sources: National police agencies and justice departments and BSA & IDC 
Global Software Piracy Study.) 
 The specific attributes available for each of these categories in listed in Table 1 below. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Categories and attributes of data available in the ECIR Data Dashboard. 
 
The choice of categories was dictated by theoretical and empirical considerations. 
Theoretically, the choice is influenced by the theory of lateral pressure in international relations, 
which highlights the internal determinants of external behavior and the intermediating factors 
that shape various activities and outcomes. This choice will allow us in subsequent research to 
explore the relative influence of various internal factors and mediating variables upon final 
outcomes. In this paper we present the baseline inquiry, the basic platform and select – physical, 
political, and perceptual – that would be likely to relate to or influence behavioral factors, in this 
case cyber crimes. In the current exploration we consider threat attitudes as intervening or 
intermediary variables.  
The Dashboard allows the user to select any number of countries (and/or regions) with 
which to compare the data. The X-axis measurement is time (currently in years), and any of the 
data mentioned above can be selected for the Y-axis, allowing the user to compare correlations in 
multiple strands of data, each of which is for one country or region. Also, the Dashboard allows 
the user to divide one strand of data into another. This allows the user to compare the data in new 
ways. For example: dividing population into any measurement creates a “per capita” 
measurement. Likewise, the user can compare the viruses reported per number of Internet users. 
 Additionally, the user can select to graph the data on a linear or logarithmic scale, which can 
be very helpful in studying trends when comparing data, say from a large country with that of a 
small country (the small country data might appear as a straight line at zero on a linear scale). 
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 The Dashboard thus provides the user with a great amount of flexibility and power in finding 
exactly what data to compare, how to compare it, and how to illustrate it, so that multinational 
cybersecurity data can be deeply and robustly investigated. 
 
2.2 Data Dashboard Technology and Operation 
The Dashboard technology has three primary parts: Web user interface, database system, and 
recent news headlines. The details of these employed technologies and the operation of the ECIR 
Data Dashboard have been described a previous publication (Madnick et al, 2009), the current 
version of which can be accessed at http://coin.mit.edu:8080/Dashboard/ . Brief instructions on 
its operation can be found at http://coin.mit.edu:8080/Dashboard/resources/instruction.pdf . 
 
3. Analysis of Cybercrime related data and the development and exploration of hypotheses 
 Much of the information in the ECIR Data Dashboard is gathered from national 
organizations such as CERTs and police agencies. A primary advantage of having these sources 
in the Dashboard is that it enables cross-national analyses of organizational effectiveness; 
however, national organizations may suffer from reporting discrepencies that can bias results. 
Although careful research can mitigate some of these concerns, it is also advantageous to 
leverage survey data in which these biases have already been eliminated. 
 For analysis of software piracy rates across countries, we can also use data provided by the 
BSA & IDC Global Software Piracy Study. This study uses survey methods that determine the 
total dollar value of software deployed in a given year versus the volume of legally acquired 
software in a given year. The difference between these two metrics provides a rough 
approximation of the degree of software piracy in a country. While the data is still subject to 
potential survey error, the fact that the survey is centrally administered and vetted removes the 
possibility of capturing substantial national reporting discrepancies. By pairing this data with 
national level demographic and political variables within the dashboard, we can provide a 
nuanced analysis of software piracy trends across a variety of key countries. 
 
Hypotheses and Analyses 
 The following set of charts plots software piracy levels for seven countries: the United States, 
China, Japan, Brazil, South Korea, Germany, and Malaysia. These particular nations were 
selected in order to provide a mix of developed and less developed countries as well as a wide 
range of population levels and regime types.  The selection of these countries was based on the 
need to include a diverse set of states, with different attributes and potentially different 
intervening variables. Accordingly, this would allow us to avoid a built in regression toward the 
mean in drawing inferences. 
 At first glance, the United States and China possess the highest levels of software piracy (see 
Figure 1). However, these totals are not necessarily indicative of piracy rates, as they may simply 
reflect the large number of computer users within each country.  
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Figure 1. Software Piracy Loses 
Descending Order (2008): USA, China, Germany, Brazil, Japan, Korea, Malaysia 
 
 In order to control for this effect, Figure 2 shows the piracy losses in each country scaled by 
the number of personal computers. The number of computers within each country is likely to be 
directly correlated with software piracy, so this metric provides a means to determine 
individual-level piracy rates. Note that information on personal computer ownership was 
unavailable for Japan and for the years 2007 and 2008, so this metric must be viewed as an 
incomplete approximation. 
 After scaling, it is clear that China’s rate of piracy per computer significantly exceeds that of 
the United States.  Additionally, the data display several interesting trends. Although Germany 
initially exhibited a very high rate of piracy, this rate has decreased every year and has converged 
to the level of the United States. When viewed in contrast with the relatively flat gains in the 
number of personal computers in this period (Figure 3), this pattern may be indicative of an 
increasingly effective legal response to or awareness of software piracy. In contrast, Malaysia has 
experienced a sharp increase in computer piracy over this period. Lastly, it seems clear that 
countries are not necessarily observing similar patterns in software piracy rates; while some 
countries have fairly stable and low rates (e.g. South Korea), the rates in other countries fluctuate 
substantially from year to year. 
 
 
6 
 
 
Figure 2. Software Piracy Losses per Personal Computer 
Descending Order (2006): China, Malaysia, USA, Germany , Brazil, Japan, Korea 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Number of Personal Computers 
 
One alternate method to derive the rate of piracy within each country involves scaling piracy 
losses by the number of Internet users, as can be seen in Figure 4.  Clearly, this is a less direct 
proxy for software piracy than the number of scaled computers; for instance, in many less 
developed countries, users may have extensive access to Internet cafes, libraries, and corporate 
computers without owning a personal computer. Despite this potential difference in scaling, data 
are more widely available for this metric and one could make a strong case that software piracy 
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is increasingly correlated with Internet usage, illustrating that this proxy might be an appropriate 
metric to observe comparative trends. 
 With this revised metric, the United States and Germany possess the highest rates of piracy, 
followed by developing countries such as China and Brazil. Interestingly, China’s rate exhibits a 
sharp drop after 2006. this may either reflect a sharp rise in Internet users or an increase in 
effective enforcement on a per user basis. While the data on piracy per computer seem to 
contradict this trend, this metric is unavailable from 2006-2008, so it is impossible to compare 
each metric directly. As in the previous chart, Germany shows a strong improvement, while the 
record of the United States is mixed.  
 
 
Figure 4. Software Piracy Losses per User with Internet Access 
Descending Order (2008): USA, Germany, China, Brazil, Malaysia, Japan, Korea 
 
 Although the BSA & IDC Global Software Piracy Study is centrally administered and we 
would not expect significant reporting discrepancies among countries with regard to reported 
levels of piracy, it is reasonable to expect that different nations would have different levels of 
enforcement vis-à-vis piracy that may affect the volume of illegal activity. One candidate method 
to measure this variation is the Rule of Law index, compiled by the World Bank and illustrated in 
Figure 5. Nations with higher Rule of Law should theoretically display lower rates of cyber 
crime versus countries with less developed legal systems. 
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Figure 5. Rule of Law Index 
Descending Order (2008): Germany, USA, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Brazil, China 
 
 When software piracy losses are scaled by Rule of Law, the United States is the clear 
underperformer, as can be seen in Figure 6.  The reasoning behind this ranking is easily 
apparent – for a country with extensive rule of law, the United States exhibits an unually high 
volume of software piracy. However, in a similar fashion to Figure 1, this scaled variable still 
references the absolute number of piracy losses and is not necessarily indicative of the rate of 
piracy. In order to achieve an unbiased ratio, it is necessary to scale this variable by the the 
number of personal computers and Internet users (Figures 7 & 8). 
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Figure 6. Software Piracy Losses adjusted for Rule of Law Index 
Descending Order (2008): USA, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Brazil, China 
 
(Piracy Losses * Rule of Law) / # of Internet Users 
 
Figure 7. Software Piracy Losses adjusted for Rule of Law per Internet User 
Descending Order (2007): Germany, USA, Japan, South Korea, China, Malaysia, Brazil 
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 (Piracy Losses * Rule of Law) / # of Personal Computers 
 
Figure 8. Software Piracy Losses adjusted for Rule of Law per Personal Computer 
Descending Order (2007): Germany, USA, China, Malaysia, South Korea 
 
 Several caveats apply to the preceding figures. Metrics that are scaled by rule of law 
effectively penalize developed states relative to underdeveloped states. Alternatively, they point 
to the incomplete institutional structure and design in developing countries. It remains an open 
question whether this is appropriate – while we naturally would expect these countries to display 
less piracy due to more effective legal systems, it remains an open question whether the level of 
software piracy is directly correlated with a country’s legal climate. Since software piracy is a 
relatively new phenomenon, it may not be viewed as ‘illegal’ by many individuals and, as a 
result, enforcement may be weak. Further, given the novelty of the phenomenon, societies may 
have different ways of informing citizens and different instruments and tools for enforcing 
regulations. Due to this possible trend, these estimates may overstate the effect that a shift on the 
Rule of Law index may be expected to have on piracy rates. 
 Despite these possible sources of inference error – perhaps capturing different influences at 
the same time – there is a corresponding advantage to using these metrics. By controlling for the 
rule of law in a given country as well as the country’s size, we can reduce variation across states 
and produce rough estimates of ‘natural’ piracy rates. In short, these metrics allow us to test what 
the level of piracy would be if each country possessed identical legal systems as well as similar 
endowments in technological infrastructure. 
 The results show that Germany and the United States are relative underperformers. Although 
this result may be unsurprising given the level of technological development in each country, it is 
interesting to note the comparatively low piracy rates for South Korea and Japan across a variety 
of metrics. There might even be a sociological explanation, namely that high conformity is 
valued in Asian societies, whereas in the United States, and perhaps less in Germany, individual 
initiative dominates, and is often rewarded.  These cases suggest that piracy levels may not 
necessarily be conditional on technological development, but may stem from cultural or legal 
factors that vary from country to country. 
 In conclusion, the results suggest that the absolute volume of software piracy has risen over 
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the past decade, with the bulk of activity in a few nations such as the United States and China. 
The trends affecting piracy rates are more ambiguous, however, with different countries 
exhibiting different levels and trends. Surprisingly, a country’s rate of piracy does not seem to be 
conditional on whether it is a developed or a less developed country. In almost all of the metrics 
examined here, Korea and Japan have outperformed, while the United States and Germany have 
exhibited less positive results. Although isolating the national events that lead to these different 
trends is difficult, this analysis suggests fruitful avenues for further research should data remain 
consistently available for the selected countries. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This analysis has sought to accomplish two distinct tasks. First, although Internet security 
data is scant and scattered across the Internet, we were nevertheless able to identify and illustrate 
several interesting trends from existing data that shed light on how different nations and 
organizations are coping with the global rise of cyber crime. Second, our results highlight several 
inconsistencies and ambiguities in data provided by different organizations, and we believe that 
relying on these published statistics without the benefit of a rigorous comparative analysis could 
lead to fundamentally misleading conclusions regarding the international efforts to improve 
cybersecurity and fight against cybercrime.  
Although the data challenges may be interpreted as an argument against using such data 
sources, our research implies that the dilemmas could be ameliorated through careful analysis 
and by promoting a minimum level of standardization across Internet security statistics and the 
contexts within which they are collected.. If stronger data provisions are enacted, we are 
confident that the international community would improve the odds of learning from other 
organizations, identifying rising threats, and stemming the tide of cybercrime.  Lastly, it is clear 
through our analysis that an increase in data availability – be it from governments, CERTs, or 
international organizations – could yield positive effects in both supporting existing scholarship 
and the expansion into new fields of knowledge related to cyber crime. 
With the increasing global interconnection of computer networks and sophistication of cyber 
attacks, the need for collective and cooperative cybersecurity measures have been drawing more 
attention, so that cybersecurity emergencies can be prevented or efficiently addressed. This paper 
first introduces the various organizations that produce quantitative and qualitative cybersecurity 
data. Although much information is freely shared and non-confidential, few organizations 
provide standardized or reliable metrics and where data exists, it usually limited in scope and 
rarely aggregated. This paper introduces the ECIR Data Dashboard Project developed to gather 
the cybersecurity data that are publicly provided by national and international organizations and 
provide stakeholders with a comprehensive set of data, across multiple countries, multiple data 
categories, and multiple years on nation-level cybersecurity, cybercrime, IT characteristics, 
political environment, and demographics. In spite of the identified shortcomings of the data, it is 
possible to learn and identify interesting trends using the Data Dashboard.  
In the future, as part of the ECIR project, more data sources will be identified and 
incorporated to increase the effectiveness of the Dashboard project, so that further interesting 
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international cybersecurity relations can be investigated. Also, existing and advanced techniques, 
such as the utilization of semantic integration technologies, will be applied to address and 
improve the data inconsistency problems among different organizations.  
One important aspect of our research is to explore and promote the economic and social 
incentives of gathering and sharing the nation-level cybersecurity data among the national and 
international organizations (e.g., CERTs) as well as the data of other organizations, both public 
and private, that gather relevant cybersecurity data. 
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